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Abstract
This paper presents the results of the Dynamic Pricing Challenge, held on the occasion
of the 17th INFORMS Revenue Management and Pricing Section Conference on June
29-30, 2017 in Amsterdam, The Netherlands. For this challenge, participants submitted
algorithms for pricing and demand learning of which the numerical performance was
analyzed in simulated market environments. This allows consideration of market dynamics
that are not analytically tractable or can not be empirically analyzed due to practical
complications. Our findings implicate that the relative performance of algorithms varies
substantially across different market dynamics, which confirms the intrinsic complexity
of pricing and learning in the presence of competition.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
It is becoming increasingly common in today’s online marketplaces that sellers’ pricing
decisions are determined by algorithms. The most striking example is arguably Ama-
zon.com, which made more than 2.5 million price changes each day during 2013—a stag-
gering figure that—most likely—has only increased ever since.3 Even the price of the
Bible—not the most obvious candidate for dynamic pricing—changes dozens of times
each year,4 which reveals that algorithmic pricing has gained a strong foothold in today’s
business practice. The complexities of optimally adjusting prices in response to competi-
tors’ prices, changing market circumstances, interactions between products in the seller’s
own portfolio, consumer reviews, incomplete information about consumers behavior, and
many more factors that affect demand and revenue are obviously huge. To address these
complexities, a large stream of scientific literature has emerged that designs pricing al-
gorithms and analyzes their performance. A particularly large research area has evolved
around the question of learning : how should a seller price its products to optimize profit
when the price-demand relation is unknown upfront, and therefore has to be learned from
accumulating sales data?
In recent years, a large number of studies have appeared that address this question from
a monopolist’s perspective (see literature review below). These research efforts have led to
an understanding of the structure of optimal pricing strategies in a monopolist setting, in
particular into the question of how much effort a seller should put into price experiments
in order to strike the right balance between ‘exploration’ (conducting price experiments in
order to learn the price-demand relation) and ‘exploitation’ (utilizing statistical knowledge
to maximize profit).
For pricing and learning in a competitive environment, the picture is rather different.
It turns out to be very difficult to give a useful qualitative assessment of a pricing strategy,
for the simple reason that its performance depends on the (unknown) pricing behavior
of competitors. A particular strategy may work very well when used against simplistic
pricing rules, but perform much worse against sophisticated algorithms. Even the right
performance measure is not clear (can one, e.g., improve upon the full information Nash
equilibrium?). Not only is theoretical understanding limited; there also does not appear
to be an extensive numerical study that compares the practical performance of different
algorithms.
Thus, there is a serious lack of understanding of the structure of well-performing pric-
3https://www.profitero.com/2013/12/profitero-reveals-that-amazon-com-makes-more-than-2-5-
million-price-changes-every-day/, visited on December 12, 2017.
4https://camelcamelcamel.com/Holy-Bible-James-Version-Burgundy/product/0718015592, visited on
December 12, 2017
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ing strategies with learning and competition, while at the same time understanding these
pricing strategies is increasingly important from a practical viewpoint. This motivated the
organizers of the INFORMS Revenue Management & Pricing Section Conference 2017 to
organize a dynamic pricing contest, in order to get insights into the numerical performance
of different pricing strategies in a competitive environment with incomplete information,
and so to gain insight into the properties of well-performing pricing policies. The results
of this contest are reported in this paper.
1.2 Literature
The literature on ‘learning and earning’ from a monopolist’s perspective has gained much
attention in recent years: see, e.g., Araman and Caldentey (2009), Besbes and Zeevi
(2009), Farias and van Roy (2010), Harrison et al. (2012), Broder and Rusmevichientong
(2012), Chen and Farias (2013), Cheung et al. (2013), den Boer and Zwart (2014), Keskin
and Zeevi (2014), den Boer and Zwart (2015), and Johnson Ferreira et al. (2016). A
recent review of these and related references is provided by den Boer (2015). A main
take-away from this strand of literature is the importance of having the ‘right’ amount of
price experimentation.
The importance of incorporating competition into these learning-and-earning models,
and the potential detrimental effect of ignoring competition, has been demonstrated by
Schinkel et al. (2002), Tuinstra (2004), Bischi et al. (2004, 2007), Isler and Imhof (2008),
Cooper et al. (2014), and Anufriev et al. (2013), building forth on earlier work by Kirman
(Kirman, 1975, 1983, 1995, Brousseau and Kirman, 1992).
Various approaches have been adopted to incorporate competition into learning-and-
earning problems. Bertsimas and Perakis (2006) consider least-squares learning in an
oligopoly with finite inventories and linear demand function, and propose an algorithm for
estimation and pricing. Kwon et al. (2009), Li et al. (2010), Chung et al. (2012) adopt the
framework of differential variational inequalities to study a capacitated oligopoly, propose
an algorithm to solve these equations, and estimate unknown parameters via Kalman
filtering. Perakis and Sood (2006) (see also Friesz et al. (2012)) take a robust-optimization
approach to the dynamic oligopoly pricing problem, and study Nash equilibrium policies.
Fisher et al. (2017) conduct a field experiment with randomized prices to estimate a
consumer-choice model that does not require competitor sales observations, design a best-
response pricing strategy, and test it with a field experiment for a leading Chinese online
retailer.
A sample from the extensive economics and econometrics literature that study asymp-
totic behavior of pricing strategies in competitive environments is Cyert and DeGroot
(1970), Kirman (1975), Aghion et al. (1993), Mirman et al. (1993), Fishman and Gan-
dal (1994), Harrington (1995), Bergemann and Valimaki (1996), Gallego (1998), Alepuz
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and Urbano (1999), Rassenti et al. (2000), Belleflamme and Bloch (2001), Keller and
Rady (2003), Dimitrova and Schlee (2003). These papers typically assume that a par-
ticular learning method is used by the competitors, and study whether the price process
converges to a Nash equilibrium.
The computer science literature also proposes several pricing-and-learning algorithms,
see e.g. Greenwald and Kephart (1999), Dasgupta and Das (2000), Tesauro and Kephart
(2002), Kutschinski et al. (2003), Ko¨no¨nen (2006), Jumadinova and Dasgupta (2008,
2010), Ramezani et al. (2011). For a further discussion of these and other relevant papers,
we refer to Section 6.2 of den Boer (2015).
Finally, several simulation platforms have been designed to assess the performance of
pricing policies, see, e.g., DiMicco et al. (2003) or Boissier et al. (2017).
1.3 Contributions
This paper presents the results of the Dynamic Pricing Challenge, held on the occasion
of the 17th INFORMS Revenue Management and Pricing Section Conference on June
29-30, 2017, at the Centrum Wiskunde & Informatica, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
For this challenge, participants were invited to submit pricing and learning algorithms
that would compete for revenue in a broad range of simulated market environments in
both duopoly and oligopoly settings. The extensive simulations that we ran allow us
to describe the numerical performance of various pricing and learning algorithms and
provides insight into the performance and properties of several types of policies. Given
that the participants submitted a wide variety of algorithms—such as bandit-type models,
customer choice models, econometric regression models, machine learning models, and
greedy ad-hoc approaches—we are able to relate the performance of a broad range of
algorithms to different market structures.
Hence, this paper offers a framework to analyze various paradigms from the field
of pricing and learning with competition and allows us to consider market dynamics
that are analytically intractable and can not be empirically analyzed due to practical
complications. As such, this paper presents the results of a controlled field experiment
that improve our understanding of pricing and learning with competition and helps to
guide future research. Our most important findings are:
• Relative performance varies substantially across different market dynamics. Some
algorithms perform well in competitive environments, whereas others are better at
exploiting monopolist-like environments. None of the considered algorithms is able
to dominate the others in all settings.
• Relative performance varies substantially across oligopoly and duopoly markets. For
example, algorithms based on linear demand models perform very well in duopoly
competitions, whilst performing poorly in oligopolies.
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• The algorithms that generate most revenue are very reliant on price-sensitive cus-
tomers, making them vulnerable to intensified competition. Other algorithms are
more robust in a sense that they were able to generate revenue from various types
of customers and attract more loyal customers.
• A greedy algorithm that follows the lowest-priced competitor in a tit-for-tat fashion
proves very difficult to outperform.
• Ignoring competition is increasingly harmful when competition is more fierce, i.e.,
when the number of competitors in the market is large and/or price sensitivity of
the customers is high.
• The amount of exploration needs careful consideration as too much exploration hurts
performance significantly.
The organization of the rest of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we describe the
experimental design of this study. In Section 3 and 4 the results are presented and
discussed, respectively. Finally, in Section 5 some concluding remarks are provided.
2 Experimental Design
2.1 Experimental Setting
This experiment was designed to resemble a market in which the competitors all sell a
single product to a group of heterogeneous customers. The competitors have no informa-
tion a priori on either the demand mechanism or the behavior of the other competitors
and are required to post a price before each (discrete) time period. Furthermore, it was
assumed that competitors can monitor each other’s prices, but only observe their own
sales (we refer to sales as the number of items sold). This is true for many markets
in reality, especially in online retailing, where retailers can monitor competitors’ prices
without much effort. Thus, the participants of this experiment were required to design
an algorithm that would accept as input their own realized sales and the historical prices
of all competitors and, subsequently, as output returns their price for the period to come.
In addition, we assumed there are no inventory restrictions and, to give the participants
some direction, the following domain knowledge was made available: “it seems unlikely
that posting prices higher than 100 is optimal”. For convenience and to prevent compat-
ibility issues, all participants were required to submit their pricing policy in Python 2.7.x
or 3.x and no restrictions on the use of libraries were put in place.
To evaluate the performance of all submitted policies we ran 5000 simulations, where
a single simulation consists of two different settings of competitive market environments:
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Competitor 1
Competitor 2
Competitor 8
Demand 
mechanism
p1 Competitor 1
Competitor 2
Competitor 8
p1,.., p8, d1
Demand 
mechanism
t=1	
p2
p8
p1
p2
p8
p1,.., p8, d2
p1,.., p8, d8
p1,.., p8, d1
p1,.., p8, d2
p1,.., p8, d8
t=2	
Figure 1: Overview of one simulation (oligopoly competition only); pi and di denote the
price and sales quantity of competitor i, respectively.
• Duopoly competition: all competitors compete in a round-robin setup, i.e., each
competitor competes with all other competitors in one-vs-one contests.
• Oligopoly competition: all competitors compete simultaneously against each other.
Thus, if m is the number of participating competitors, each simulation consists of
(
m
2
)
duopoly competitions and one oligopoly competition (in this experiment there were eight
competitors, thus m = 8 and each simulation consists of
(
8
2
)
= 28 duopolies and one
oligopoly). The oligopoly competition is especially insightful as it allows us to evaluate
the competitors in a very competitive environment, whereas the duopoly competition can
help us understand what the relative strength of the different competitors is.
In a single simulation, each of the duopoly competitions and the oligopoly competi-
tion consists of 1000 discrete time periods. This means that for t ∈ {1, . . . , 1000}, each
competitor posts a price for t + 1 and, subsequently, sales quantities for period t + 1
are generated from the undisclosed demand mechanism and all competitors earn revenue
accordingly. This iterative process for the oligopoly competition is illustrated in Figure
1, whereas for the duopoly competitions, the scheme is the same except for the number
of competitors, which is then two.
Finally, it was communicated to all participants that we would construct a ranking
and determine the winner as follows. In each simulation, for each competitor we compute
its revenue share of that particular simulation by averaging
• the competitor’s share of total revenue earned in the oligopoly competition and
• the competitor’s share of total revenue earned in the duopoly competitions.
The latter is computed by aggregating all the revenue earned in the
(
m
2
)
duopoly compe-
titions and computing the competitors’ revenue shares accordingly. More precisely, if xij
is the revenue earned by competitor j in the oligopoly competition of simulation i and
yijk is the revenue earned by competitor j in the duopoly competition versus competitor
6
k in simulation i, then competitor j’s revenue share of simulation i is equal to
1
2
(x¯ij + y¯ij), where x¯ij :=
xij∑m
k=1 xik
and y¯ij :=
∑m
k=1 yijk∑m
u=1
∑m
k=1 yiuk
. (1)
Thus x¯ij and y¯ij are the oligopoly and duopoly revenue shares, respectively, of competitor
j in simulation i. Note that, as such, a competitor’s duopoly revenue share also depends
on the revenue earned in competitions between other competitors. Consequently, it is
not beneficial to earn a high revenue share in a duopoly competition where relatively
little revenue is earned. The final score for competitor j is simply the average over all its
revenue shares, i.e., its final score equals 1
5000
∑5000
i=1
1
2
(x¯ij + y¯ij).
This way of constructing a final score is a design choice of the pricing contest; clearly,
numerous alternative ways to measure performance are conceivable.
2.2 Competitor Algorithms
In Table 1 summaries of all the competing algorithms are provided (see appendix for more
detailed descriptions). The competitors rely on a wide range of demand models:
• linear models: ols and wls (ordinary and weighted least squares, respectively),
• bandit models: b-grid, b-bucket, and b-model (bandits where the arms pertain
to price points in a grid, price buckets, and demand models, respectively),
• customer choice modeling: logit,
• machine learning: ml,
• greedy price-matching heuristic: greedy.
All competitors randomize prices in the first periods and all competitors except logit and
greedy also engage in exploration later on to capture possible non-stationary dynamics
(which was not the case for the markets that we simulated). Regarding the modeling of
competitor behavior, most competitors use variants of exponential smoothing to predict
competitor prices and optimize own prices accordingly. Others model competitors’ prices
as multivariate normal random variables, use the median of historical prices as predictor,
or ignore competition altogether. All non-bandit models use a line search to optimize
their own revenue with respect to price, except for wls, which optimizes own revenue
relative to the revenue earned by the competition.
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2.3 Demand Mechanism
The design of the demand mechanism that we propose is built on the belief that it
should resemble a competitive market with a heterogeneous customer base, as is often
observed in practice. Meanwhile, we had to carefully manage the complexity of the
demand mechanism to allow for evaluation, interpretation, and further analysis following
the contest. In doing so, we assumed the arrival process and demand mechanism to
be time-independent within a simulation, i.e., during time steps 1, . . . , 1000 the arrival
process is homogeneous and the demand function is static. Furthermore, we assumed that
the market consists of three segments, namely loyal customers, shoppers, and scientists,
who all have their own parameterized demand functions, as we will explain in the following
sections. We emphasize once more that the participants of this competition were not aware
of any of the aforementioned assumptions regarding the market structure. All in all, we
realize that the outcomes inevitably depend on the ground truth that is constructed here,
but it is intended to be versatile enough to reward the competitors that are best able to
learn various types of demand dynamics.
2.3.1 Arrivals and population composition
We assume Poisson customer arrivals over time with mean arrivals per time period equal
to λi in the i
th simulation, where λi ∼ U(50, 150). Here and throughout, if we write
x ∼ F , we mean that x is sampled from (and not distributed as) F , i.e., x is a realiza-
tion. Furthermore, we denote the shares of the three customer segments, i.e., shoppers,
loyals, and scientists, by θshoi , θ
loy
i , and θ
sci
i in the i
th simulation. In addition, the scientist
segment is assumed to consist of two subsegments, namely PhDs and professors, with re-
spective shares of γphdi and γ
prof
i . The sampling of arrivals is summarized in the code block
titled ‘Arrival Process’, where n is the number of arriving customers in a certain period,
Arrival Process
for i ∈ {1, . . . , 5000} do
Sample arrival rate λi ∼ U(50, 150)
Sample segment shares θshoi , θ
loy
i , θ
sci
i
Sample subsegment shares γphdi , γ
prof
i
for t ∈ {1, . . . , 1000} do
Sample arrivals n ∼ Poisson(λi)
Sample segment arrivals nsho, nloy, nsci ∼ Multinom(n, (θshoi , θloyi , θscii ))
Sample subsegment arrivals nphd, nprof ∼ Multinom(nsci, (γphdi , γprofi ))
end for
end for
consisting of nsho, nloy, and nsci shoppers, loyal customers, and scientists, respectively.
The scientist segment, consists of nphd PhDs and nprof professors. Thus, the number of
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arriving customers n equals nsho + nloy + nsci and the number of arriving scientists nsci
equals nphd + nprof.
2.3.2 Demand of loyal customers and shoppers
The WTP of shoppers is assumed to be exponentially distributed with mean βshoi in
simulation i, where βshoi ∼ U(5, 15). In each time period in simulation i, we sample a
WTP for each arriving shopper from the exponential distribution with mean βshoi and
compare these WTPs to the lowest price offered in the market. Each shopper for whose
WTP exceeds the lowest price offered, buys from the competitor that offers the lowest
price and otherwise leaves without buying anything. Ties are broken randomly.
For the loyal customers, we assume their WTP is exponentially distributed as well,
but with mean βloyi in simulation i, where β
loy
i = u · βshoi and u ∼ U(1.5, 2.0), making
the loyal customers relatively price-insensitive compared to the other customer groups, as
one would expect from a loyal customer segment. In the simulation, each loyal customer
is assigned randomly to a competitor, and they will buy from this competitor if their
WTP exceeds the price the competitor is offering; otherwise they leave without making
a purchase. Subsequently, we sample for all loyal customers a WTP and compare this to
the price offered by the competitor that they are loyal to. In case their WTP exceeds the
price offered, they buy, otherwise they leave without buying anything.
2.3.3 Demand scientists
The demand of the scientists is assumed to follow a finite mixture logit model, or latent
class logit model, where the mixture comprises professors and PhDs. Thus, the professors
and PhDs both choose according to a logit model with their own parameters. Let the
posted prices in period t be equal to pt and define the probability that an arriving PhD
purchases from competitor k during simulation i as follows
qphdk (pt) =
exp
(
αphdi − βphdn,i · pk,t
)
1 +
∑n
j=1 exp
(
αphdi − βphdn,i · pj,t
)
where n = 2 in the duopoly case and n = m(= 8) in the oligopoly case. This probability is
defined similarly for professors. The parameters αphdi , β
phd
n,i , α
prof
i , and β
prof
n,i of simulation
i are sampled so that the prices that would be optimal for the shoppers, loyals, PhDs,
and professors in isolation are of the same order of magnitude. This is done to ensure
that no unrealistically large differences in optimal prices between (sub)segments occur.
In doing so, for the PhDs we set αphdi equal to β
sho
i and, subsequently, set β
phd
n,i such that
the optimal price for the PhDs is within 50% of the optimal price for the shoppers (which
10
is equal to βshoi ). This is achieved as follows
αphdi = β
sho
i
pphdi := β
sho
i · u, where u ∼ U(0.50, 1.50)
βphdn,i =
W
(
neα
phd
i −1
)
+ 1
pphdi
where W is the Lambert function, i.e., W (xex) = x, which is uniquely defined in this
case as neα
phd
i −1 > 0. Thus, we set the parameters so that if the market consisted solely
of PhDs, then, overall revenue would be maximized if pphdi was set by all competitors,
where pphdi is within a reasonable distance of the average WTP of shoppers. Thus, the
parameters are set so that
arg max
p∈Rn+
∑
k
pkq
phd
k (p) = 1np
phd
i
where 1np
phd is understood to be an n-vector with each element equal to pphdi . Similarly,
we set
αprofi = α
phd
i · u, where u ∼ U(1.00, 1.25)
pprofi := p
phd
i · u, where u ∼ U(1.00, 1.50)
βprofn,i =
W
(
neα
prof
i −1
)
+ 1
pprofi
so that the optimal price in a market consisting of only professors would be higher than
in a market that consists solely of PhDs, while keeping the price levels in line.
2.3.4 Demand mechanism summary
Summarizing, in simulation i ∈ {1, . . . , 5000}, in each period we see in expectation λi ·θshoi
arriving shoppers, λi · θloyi arriving loyals, λi · θscii · γphdi arriving PhDs, and λi · θscii · γprofi
arriving professors. Each of these customer types chooses according to its own parameter-
ized demand function (of which the parameters are constant throughout the simulation)
as described in the previous sections. This all implies that in some simulations, θloyi ≈ 1
meaning that all competitors are essentially monopolists, which should theoretically lead
to higher prices, lower sales, and relatively high revenues. Another extreme, when θshoi ≈ 1,
resembles a market in which there is perfect competition—each competitor offers the same
product to arriving customers that purchase the cheapest alternative available. In this
case, one would expect prices to spiral down over time. In addition, the share of loyal
customers in the market (1
3
on average) is independent of the number of competitors in
11
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Figure 2: Boxplots of the revenue shares for the oligopoly competition, the duopoly com-
petitions, and the overall competition. In parenthesis after the names of the algorithms
are the rankings per competition part (e.g., wls was the winner of the duopoly part).
Only the first 500 of 5000 simulations are used to construct the boxplots for the sake of
readability.
the market. Therefore, in a duopoly, an arriving customer is loyal to a specific competitor
with probability 1
2
· 1
3
, whereas, in the oligopoly, this probability equals 1
m
· 1
3
. Therefore,
by construction, we anticipate the market to be much more competitive in the oligopoly
setting than in the duopoly case, as one would expect from economic theory.
3 Results
First, in Section 3.1 a summary of the overall results is presented and then, in Sections 3.2
and 3.3, the results of the oligopoly and duopoly competitions, respectively, are considered
in greater detail. Thereafter, in Section 4, a discussion is provided on the observations
presented here.
3.1 Overall Results
In Figure 2 boxplots of the revenue shares for the oligopoly, the duopoly, and the overall
competition are provided. Thus, the boxplots in the left panel are based on the x¯ij’s, in
the middle panel on the y¯ij’s, and in the right panel on
1
2
(x¯ij+y¯ij)’s, all defined in (1). The
figure reveals that logit was the eventual winner of the competition and that its success
was primarily due to its superior performance in the oligopoly competitions. Overall,
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the differences in performance in the oligopoly are substantial, whereas in the duopoly
competitions it has proven to be much harder to outperform one another. Nevertheless, we
observe remarkable differences in relative performance across the oligopoly and duopoly
parts. For example, ols nearly earned the highest mean revenue share in the duopoly
competitions, while its performance in the oligopoly competition was on average the
worst amongst all competitors. Note however, that despite this poor average, ols did
perform particularly well on some occasions (earning almost 60% of all revenue on one
occasion). The other way around, we observe that competitor greedy performs poorly
in the duopoly competitions, but that its performance in the oligopoly competition is
relatively good, being second placed only after logit. Furthermore, we observe that b-
bucket, b-grid, and ml are consistently outperformed in both duopoly and oligopoly
competitions, as they are amongst the bottom four in both parts of the competition. In
the following sections, we analyze the aforementioned observations in greater detail and
make more detailed comparisons between the different pricing strategies in the market.
3.2 Oligopoly Competition
In this section, we uncover what causes the substantial differences in performance in the
oligopoly competition, which are observable in the first panel in Figure 2. This is done by
analyzing how the competitors differ in terms of realized sales and prices posted and how
their performance varies as the market composition, i.e., the shares of segments, differs
across simulations.
First of all, in Figure 3 we present the price and revenue realizations of a single simu-
lation to demonstrate what a simulation typically looks like. Although a single simulation
is not representative for performance in general, we found that the characteristics that
can be observed in Figure 3 are demonstrative for most of the scenarios that we visu-
ally inspected. In particular, it can be observed that the prices of logit, b-model,
greedy, and wls converge (after engaging in price exploration), whilst the other com-
petitors show more erratic price paths. For example, b-bucket and b-grid put a lot
of emphasis on exploration throughout the simulation without eventually converging to
a small price range, which can be explained by the fact that these algorithms engage in
active price exploration with a 20% probability in each period. Furthermore, we see that
ols initially seems to converge to a competitive price, but that from around period 300
onwards it fluctuates around a relatively high price level, earning hardly any revenue.
Finally, regarding ml we can observe that it initiates many exploration cycles around a
cosine function, which affects its performance negatively in this stationary environment.
To analyze how the competitors differ in sales generated across segments, in Figure
4 (a) the mean sales per time period per segment for each competitor is presented (note
that sales is understood to be a quantity here and throughout). From this figure it can
13
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Figure 3: Realizations of prices and revenue for simulation 4955. The solid line repre-
sents the prices and pertains to the left axis. The red dots represent the revenue earned
and pertain to the right axis. In parenthesis is the total accumulated revenue. In this
simulation the segment shares were equal to θsho = 0.05, θloy = 0.72, and θsci = 0.23.
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Figure 4: For the oligopoly competition (a) mean sales per time period and (b) mean
revenue per arriving customer, split out over the three customer segments.
be observed that the three best-performing algorithms in the oligopoly, logit, greedy,
and b-model, are also able to generate the highest sales. Furthermore, logit not only
generates the highest total sales, but it is also able to generate the highest sales per
customer type. This could well be due to the fact that if a competitor generates high sales
in the shopper segment, this means that it is frequently the lowest priced competitor in the
market, which, in turn, means that the scientists and its loyal customers are also likely to
buy. Thus, high sales in the shopper segment leads automatically to relatively high sales
in the other two segments. In addition, it is remarkable that wls generates much lower
sales than ols, while, according to Figure 2, wls performs significantly better in terms of
revenue generation. Arguably, this is due to the fact that wls sells predominantly to the
high-paying loyal segment, whereas ols generates its revenue primarily from the shopper
and scientist segments, which are more price sensitive. Overall, the competitors that
are able to reach the shoppers and scientists are capable of generating high sales, which
concurs with the observation that for each competitor the potential sales from shoppers
and scientists is much larger than from loyal customers (as was discussed in the final part
of Section 2.3.4).
In Figure 4 (b) the mean revenue per arriving customer for each competitor is il-
lustrated (e.g., logit makes on average about 0.30 from an arriving shopper, whereas
b-grid practically earns nothing in this case). The figure reveals that the competitors’
distributions of earnings over the customer segments varies substantially. This can be
seen when considering the top performers (logit, greedy, and b-model), which make
the majority of their income from shoppers and scientists. For the other algorithms, espe-
cially ml, wls, and b-grid, it holds that they earn hardly anything from shoppers and
scientists, but are able to earn relatively much from incoming loyal customers. To relate
these observations to the prices posted in the market, we provide in Figure 5 boxplots of
the prices posted and in Table 2, amongst other things, the fraction of time periods in
which a competitor was the lowest or highest priced competitor in the market. In general,
15
0 20 40 60 80 100
Price
LOGIT (368)
GREEDY (6)
WLS (77)
B-MODEL (384)
B-BUCKET (904)
ML (352)
B-GRID (421)
OLS (0)
Figure 5: Boxplot based on the prices posted in 5000 randomly chosen time periods (out
of 5000× 1000 time periods in total). The bars and crosses denote the median and mean,
respectively. In brackets are the corresponding number of outliers.
Price Sales Revenue
Low High Low High Low High
logit 0.55 0.00 0.01 0.37 0.02 0.23
ols 0.13 0.60 0.69 0.13 0.68 0.14
b-bucket 0.08 0.09 0.27 0.07 0.27 0.07
b-grid 0.00 0.19 0.47 0.00 0.44 0.10
b-model 0.20 0.06 0.23 0.19 0.24 0.15
ml 0.01 0.08 0.36 0.01 0.35 0.08
greedy 0.46 0.00 0.06 0.27 0.07 0.15
wls 0.00 0.01 0.17 0.00 0.16 0.09
Table 2: Fraction of time periods (of 5000 × 1000 time periods total) in which a com-
petitor was lowest/highest priced, generated the lowest/highest sales, and earned the
lowest/highest revenue. The column sums are greater than one because ties occur.
we observe that the successful algorithms set relatively low prices, earn most revenue from
shoppers and scientists, and relatively little revenue from the loyal customers. It is by no
means immediate that logit’s low-pricing strategy works well under all circumstances—
its dependency on shoppers and scientists makes logit vulnerable in case the market
consists of more competitors that are aggressive on price. Thus, in a sense is b-model
more robust by being less reliant on the price sensitive segments. This is also illustrated
by b-grid, which only serves loyal customers and generates the least sales, but does not
earn substantially less than wls, ml, and, b-bucket and performs substantially better
than ols.
Regarding price experimentation, we observe from Figure 5 that ols’s policy induces
a very wide price range, with its first quartile around twenty and the third quartile just
below eighty, resembling a Gaussian distribution of prices. In addition, greedy does
not engage in much price experimentation, as one would expect from its construction.
The other boxplots indicates that the price distributions all have a heavy right tail; these
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Figure 6: Mean prices for various levels of the share of loyal customers θloy.
competitors engage in exploration coincidentally, while pricing around a relatively small
interval for most of the time.
In Figure 6 the mean prices for different values of θloy are given. This is insightful,
since when the share of loyal customers increases from zero to one, the market moves
from a very competitive market to a market in which every competitor is essentially a
monopolist. One would theoretically expect that competitors post higher prices once
their pricing power increases. However, from the figures, we can observe that the prices
of three of the four worst-performers, namely ols, b-grid, and ml, do not increase in
the share of loyal customers. On the other hand, the prices of logit, greedy, wls,
b-bucket, and b-model, do increase in the share of loyal customers. This indicates
that these competitors are better capable of identifying the market structure and improve
pricing decisions accordingly.
Finally, Figures 7 and 8 illustrate the mean revenue per time period for various seg-
ment shares of loyal customers, and scientists, respectively.5 From Figure 7 we observe
that, in general, revenues increase as the share of loyal customers increases, as one would
theoretically expect. However, some competitors are better capable of exploiting the in-
crease in pricing power than others—for example wls’s relative performance improves
substantially as θloy increases, while logit’s relative performance deteriorates. On the
other hand, in Figure 8 we observe that performance across competitors diverges as the
share of scientists increases. Most notably, logit’s relative performance increases sub-
stantially, which can be attributed to the fact that logit’s demand specification is able
to closely resemble the demand function of the scientists (which is a finite mixture of logit
demand functions).
5The figure for the shopper segment is very similar to Figure 7 except for that the revenues decrease
in the shopper share — figure is omitted to save space.
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3.3 Duopoly Competition
From Figure 2 it follows that in the duopoly competitions the differences in performance
are less substantial than in the oligopoly competition. Two reasons can be identified why
this is the case. First of all, the share of loyal customers is relatively large in the duopoly, so
that both competitors have in general more pricing power whilst only having to consider
one other competitor, making it harder to outperform one another. Second of all, the
performance is not transitive in a sense that “if A beats B and B beats C, then A beats
C”, so that differences in performance tend to cancel out over the duopolies. Nonetheless,
the duopolies are interesting to analyze the relative performance of the various pricing
policies.
For a single simulation, in Figure 9 we provide the realized prices and revenue of
duopolies in which wls, the top performer in the duopoly part, was involved.6 The figure
reveals that in the duopoly in which wls and logit compete relatively little revenue is
generated since both algorithms price very low—this is not only the case in this example,
but is a structural property, as will be shown below. It is interesting to see that greedy’s
performance is weakened by its mechanism that resets prices to 5 if prices get too low
(these are the bumps that are visible in the plot). Finally, as was the case in the oligopoly,
ols is in this case not able to find a competitive price level consistently (however it was
still able to perform well in the duopolies).
In Table 3 the mean revenue per time period for all the duopolies are provided. The last
column contains the row-wise averages, which indicate how much revenue each algorithm
makes on average overall. Similarly, the final row contains column-wise averages, which
indicate how much revenue other algorithms were able to make against the corresponding
algorithm (thus, e.g., logit makes on average 234 per time period, while the other
competitors make on average 218 when competing with logit). The table confirms
6A plot of wls vs b-grid is omitted to save space but is very similar to the plot of wls vs b-bucket.
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Figure 9: Realizations of prices and revenue for simulation 2285. The red and green
solid lines represent the prices of WLS and the corresponding opponent, respectively, and
pertains to the left axis. The red and green dotted lines represent the cumulative revenue
earned by WLS and the corresponding opponent, respectively, and pertains to the right
axis. In parenthesis is the total accumulated revenue. In this simulation the segment
shares were equal to θsho = 0.33, θloy = 0.29, and θsci = 0.38.
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logit 252 221 319 238 242 266 96 234
ols 235 172 265 210 295 256 249 240
b-bucket 175 249 256 207 272 198 175 219
b-grid 196 247 169 239 306 274 181 230
b-model 250 231 185 241 270 176 218 224
ml 249 221 177 236 203 216 186 213
greedy 267 260 206 273 196 209 123 219
wls 153 257 234 361 219 317 140 240
average 218 245 195 279 216 273 218 175
Table 3: The pairwise mean revenue per time period for all duopolies. Each cell indicates
how much revenue the algorithm in the corresponding row was able to earn against the
algorithm in the corresponding column on average per time period. Green (red) indicates
if the amount was higher (lower) than that of the corresponding opponent.
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Figure 10: The number in each cell indicates the mean price that the algorithm in the
corresponding row posted against the algorithm in the corresponding column. The color
of each cell pertains to the coefficient of variation (i.e., the ratio of the standard deviation
to the mean) and corresponds to the color bar on the right.
the observation from Figure 9 that the market between wls and logit is on average the
smallest (153 + 96 = 249 revenue per time period). In fact, wls proves to be very hard
to generate revenue against, since on average competitors earn only 175 per time period
when competing with wls. Meanwhile, wls is able to generate substantial profits with
an average revenue per time period of 240, and as a result wls was able to beat all other
competitors based on revenue earned. This is remarkable, as wls performs poorly in the
oligopoly, as was discussed in the previous section.
Furthermore, we observe that the results are very mixed and that there is no com-
petitor that loses against all other competitors. Even the worst performer, ml, is able
to defeat other competitors, namely, logit and greedy, which is remarkable as both
perform very well overall. In addition, based on Table 3 we observe that greedy has a
very steady performance, never earning much more (or much less) than its opponents, as
one would expect—it simply follows its opponent’s actions, without exploiting the oppo-
nent’s weakness. The other top performer in the duopoly part, namely ols, only beats
b-grid and ml according to Table 3. Nonetheless, we observe that ols on average earns
the same amount of revenue, namely 240, as wls.
All in all, Table 3 reveals that the performance is very much dependent on the competi-
tor’s policy and that some algorithms that perform well in the oligopoly (e.g., greedy),
struggle in the duopolies and vice versa (e.g., ols). This, once more, confirms the intrinsic
complexity of pricing and learning with competition.
Finally, to gain insight in the pricing levels of the competitors in the duopoly competi-
tions, in Figure 10 a heatmap of the mean prices and the coefficient of variation (the ratio
20
of the standard deviation to the mean) is provided. The numerical values correspond to
the mean prices posted and the color indicates the amount of dispersion in the prices.
We observe that wls consistently has the lowest mean price and that ols, which per-
formed equally well according to Figure 2, posted on average substantially higher prices
than wls. Thus, ols is able to remain competitive while maintaining a higher overall
price level. Other algorithms, e.g., b-grid, also maintain a high mean price level, but
are less successful in generating profit. This can well be explained by the fact that the
price level of b-grid is much less dependent on its competitor, i.e., its mean price posted
is always around 20, whereas ols varies its pricing level across its competitors, thereby
being able to generate more profit. Regarding the dispersion of prices, we observe that
wls, b-model, and ml are the least experimental in setting prices and that especially
b-bucket is very experimental, which is in correspondence with Figures 3 and 9.
4 Discussion
In terms of overall performance, logit has proven to be the most effective algorithm in
this competition—it earned most revenue in the oligopoly part and was also competitive
in the duopoly part, where it finished in third place, close behind ols and wls. Its success
can partly be explained by the fact that its demand specification closely resembles the
demand function of the scientist segment, which led to the highest revenue per arriving
scientist (see Figures 4 (b) and 8). However, the fact that logit was able to identify and
exploit the revenue potential of the shopper segment by often pricing low was undoubtedly
the key reason for its success. This strategy negatively affected performance when pricing
power increased (see Figure 7), but proved beneficial overall. Arguably, if greedy would
not have had arrangements in place to prevent a ‘race to the bottom’, logit’s revenue
might have been substantially lower. This indicates that logit’s low-pricing strategy will
not perform well in all circumstances—its dependency on shoppers and scientists makes
logit vulnerable in case the market consists of more competitors that are aggressive on
price. In terms of robustness, b-model performs well as it is less reliant on the price-
sensitive segments, whilst still earning substantial revenue.
Regarding the two linear models (wls and ols), the difference in their performance
between the duopoly and oligopoly parts is striking. In the duopoly setup, wls and ols
are the two top performers, thereby confirming that the use of linear approximations for
demand can give a simple and robust way to model demand for local price changes. The
design of wls, which anticipates its competitor’s revenue by maximizing the difference
of own and the competitor’s revenue, has caused wls to be very difficult to earn revenue
against (see Table 3). On the other hand, ols ignored competition altogether, which
worked surprisingly well in the duopoly competitions and resulted in ols posting much
higher prices than wls according to Figure 10 (but generating roughly the same amount
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of revenue). In the oligopoly setup, however, wls and especially ols struggled, which
indicates that ignoring competition is increasingly harmful as competition increases and
that, regarding wls, explicitly taking into account all competitors’ anticipated revenues
has proven ineffective. Similarly, the relative performance of b-grid, which also ignored
competition, was worse in the oligopoly.
Two of the bandit models, namely b-grid and b-bucket, performed poorly due to a
defect in their designs, which only allowed prices in very crudely discretized price sets and
prevented them to set low prices consistently thereby greatly hindering their performance.
The algorithms could be improved by making them more adaptive by, e.g., allowing poorly
performing arms to be eliminated or adding additional arms close to the current optimal
value to allow the algorithm to focus in on profitable prices. It would also be interesting
to assess the performance of existing continuous armed-bandit algorithms.
However, the other bandit model, b-model, proved to be competitive and finished
third overall. It was designed to cope with different customer behaviors (e.g., bargain
hunters and quality seekers, see the appendix for details) by assigning a different demand
model to each of its arms. The relative success of the b-model appears to have been its
ability to generate above average revenues from each customer segment as, e.g., illustrated
in Figure 4 (b). One of its pitfalls has been its high level of exploration of price points as
illustrated in, e.g., Figures 3 and 5, especially in comparison to logit and greedy.
The approach of ml heavily relied on machine learning methods to model the de-
mand characteristics and was designed to cope with non-stationarities, such as changes
in the price elasticity over time or changes in the overall demand volume. In doing so,
ml persisted in engaging in exploration cycles, which hindered its performance in the sta-
tionary environment that was simulated. This confirms the notion that one should only
experiment if the anticipated long-term revenue of doing so outweighs the short-term cost.
Finally, certainly the most simple strategy, namely greedy’s ad-hoc approach of
matching the lowest price in the market, turned out to be very effective in the oligopoly.
Generally, it followed whoever was the lowest priced (mostly logit and b-model) and
was thereby able to generate substantial revenue especially from scientists and shoppers.
The arrangements that greedy put in place to prevent downward price spirals were
initiated frequently (see, e.g., Figure 9), which could otherwise have led to even lower
prices and presumably deteriorating revenues. In the duopoly part, no competitor was
able to significantly outperform greedy, as one would expect, however, greedy was not
able to exploit competitors’ weaknesses either, leading to average performance.
5 Conclusion and Managerial Insights
This paper presented the results of the Dynamic Pricing Challenge, held on the occasion
of the 17th INFORMS Revenue Management and Pricing Section Conference on June 29-
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30, 2017, at the Centrum Wiskunde & Informatica, Amsterdam, The Netherlands. The
participants of this pricing challenge submitted a wide variety of pricing and learning
algorithms of which the numerical performance in a simulated market environment with
competition was analyzed. As such, this paper presented a framework in which vari-
ous paradigms from the field of pricing and learning with competition are analyzed by
means of a controlled field experiment. This has allowed us to consider market dynamics
that are not analytically tractable or can not be empirically analyzed due to practical
complications.
Our analysis has revealed a number of interesting insights both from practical and
scientific points of view. First of all, it is shown that relative performance varies substan-
tially across oligopoly and duopoly markets and across different market dynamics, which
confirms the intrinsic complexity of pricing and learning in the presence of competition.
Most notably, none of the considered algorithms is able to consistently outperform the
market—each algorithm meets its Waterloo at some point in the competition. This reveals
that algorithm design needs careful consideration and that the structure and dynamics
of the market need to be taken into account to determine which algorithm is the best fit.
Second, a greedy algorithm that followed the lowest-priced competitor in a tit-for-tat fash-
ion has proved very difficult to outperform. Especially in the oligopolistic markets it was
able to attract substantial revenue from price-sensitive customers, whilst—as expected—
showing average performance in the duopoly competitions. Third, although the eventual
winner was determined by revenue earned, the results reveal that some algorithms are
better capable of attracting customers from different segments, thereby being less reliant
on one specific segment, and, therefore, being more robust. The winning algorithm, e.g.,
is predominantly dependent on price-sensitive customers that can easily be targeted by
competitors, whilst other competitors earned reasonable revenue from a more loyal cus-
tomer base. Fourth, the results reveal that ignoring competition is increasingly harmful
when competition is more fierce, i.e., when the number of competitors in the market is
large and/or price sensitivity of the customers is high. Finally, the analysis reveals that
too much exploration can hurt performance significantly.
Possible extensions to this study that could enhance its generalizability is to impose
more complex market dynamics in the simulations, such as temporal dependencies or
strategic customer behavior. Although it is appealing (and not too difficult) to do this,
we chose not to do so, since it makes it more cumbersome to relate the algorithms and
their performance to the dynamics of the market.
23
6 Appendix
6.1 Competitor Algorithms
6.1.1 Competitor logit
This competitor models the demand according to a finite mixture logit model, where
the mixture is taken over the number of possible customer arrivals. Thus, a probability
distribution over the the number of arrivals in a single period is estimated and for each
possible number of arrivals, a different multinomial logit model is estimated as well. Each
multinomial logit model here, induces a probability distribution over the competitors, i.e.,
it specifies with which probability an arriving customer purchases from each competitor
(including a no-purchase option). In doing so, it is assumed that the utility of buying
from competitor i is of the form a− bpi, where pi is the price posted by competitor i and
a and b are assumed to differ across the mixture components.
In practice, this competitor uses the first 100 time periods to estimate the maximum
number of arriving customers in a single time period. This is done by setting a price of
0 for the first period and for each of the following 99 periods of this exploration phase,
the price is set as the minimum of the prices observed in the previous period. After these
100 periods, an upper bound on the number of arrivals in a single period is taken as the
maximum realized demand in a single period multiplied by (m + 1), i.e., the number of
competitors plus one. Subsequently, an Expectation-Maximization algorithm is used to
estimate a probability distribution over the number of arrivals, as well as the parameters
of the multinomial logit models. All these parameters are updated every 20 time periods.
To optimize prices, in every period the competitors’ prices for the period to come
are predicted. For this purpose, it is assumed that the sorted prices of the competitors
follow a multivariate normal distribution, where the sorted prices are used to mitigate the
effect of price symmetries. Subsequently, 1000 competitor prices are sampled from the
multivariate normal distribution and the revenue function is approximated by averaging
over these realization. To optimize the price, a crude line search over a discretization of
the assumed price space (0, 100) is executed and the price with the highest revenue is
chosen.
6.1.2 Competitor ols
The approach of this competitor to pricing is to favor simplicity. The view is taken that
competitors’ actions cannot be controlled and that for all intents and purposes, they
are random. Thus, they are modeled as an aggregate source of random “noise” and the
focus is on how the competitor’s own price influences demand in this environment. The
algorithm is split into an exploration segment and a “running” segment. The exploration
segment lasts for the first 40 periods and the running segment lasts for the rest of the 960
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periods.
In the exploration segment, the algorithm explores the field to ensure sufficient vari-
ation in data. In each period, a price is sampled uniformly from the interval (0, 100).
After the exploration period, the algorithm enters the running segment. In the running
segment, the majority of the time consists of estimating a demand curve based only on
the competitor’s own historical prices and optimizing accordingly. To do so, four linear
regression models are fit, taking all combinations of log-transformation of both indepen-
dent (price) and dependent (demand) variables, and the model with the highest R2 value
is chosen (ols is an acronym for ordinary least squares). Using this model, the price is
optimized using a crude line search and, subsequently, a small perturbation is added to
the price for further exploration.
Finally, in each period in the running segment there is a 5% chance of further explo-
ration and a 1% chance of “competitive disruption”. Here, “competitive disruption” is
an action designed to intentionally confuse competitors who attempt predict competitor
prices or who use competitor prices in their model. When this action is initiated the
model sets the price to zero in an attempt to confuse competitors via extreme actions.
6.1.3 Competitor b-grid
b-grid is adapted from the ε-greedy multi-armed bandit algorithm (Sutton and Barto,
1998). It assumes a bandit framework with ten arms, where the arms pertain to the prices
10, 20, . . . , 100 (b-grid is an acronym for bandit on a grid). Thus selecting the first arm
means posting a price of 10. This algorithm neglects competition and simply keeps track
of the average revenue under each arm. With probability ε, an arm is selected randomly,
whereas with probability 1− ε, the arm that has the highest observed average revenue is
selected. The exploration parameter ε is set to 0.2, so that on average 200 time periods
are used for exploration and 800 for exploitation.
6.1.4 Competitor b-bucket
This competitor considers the problem of learning and pricing in a multi-armed bandit
framework similar to that of b-grid. In doing so, the optimal price is assumed to be
contained in the interval (0, 100], which is split into ten intervals of even length, i.e., it is
split into price buckets (0, 10], (10, 20], . . . , (90, 100]. Each of these price buckets pertains
to one arm and selecting a specific arm means posting a price that is uniformly sampled
from the corresponding price bucket (b-bucket is an acronym for bandit with buckets).
To incorporate the competitors’ prices, it is assumed that the arms’ values, i.e., rev-
enues, depend on the prices posted by the other competitors. More precisely, in each time
period the competitors’ modal price bucket is forecast using exponential smoothing. The
modal price bucket is the bucket that is predicted to contain most of the competitors’
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prices. We assume that the optimal choice of price to offer is dependent on this modal
price bucket.
In practice this works as follows. At each time step, with probability ε an exploration
step is performed in which an arm is selected randomly. Alternatively, with probability
1− ε, an exploitation step is undertaken. In this case, the algorithm selects a price from
the price bucket with the highest observed average revenue for the predicted modal price
bucket. The exploration parameter ε is set to 0.2, so that on average 200 time periods
are used for exploration and 800 for exploitation.
6.1.5 Competitor b-model
This competitor advocates a bandit formulation of the problem as well, although its design
differs conceptually from that of b-bucket and b-grid. Where the aforementioned two
competitors assign prices (or prices buckets) to arms, here, an arm pertains to a demand
model (b-model is an acronym for bandit with models). The demand models that
constitute the four arms are the following:
• Demand Model 1 (Bargain hunters) assumes that the distribution of customers’
willingness to pay (WTP) is normally distributed and that customers select a com-
petitor’s price from the subset of prices that fall below their WTP with probability
proportional to
(
WTP−pi
WTP
)b
, where pi is the price being offered by competitor i and
b is a parameter that influences customers’ price sensitivity. High (low) values of
b > 1 (< 1) capture customer populations that are highly (in)sensitive to prices
close to their reserve price. In general this first demand model captures bargain
hunters as in all cases customers will tend to choose low prices where possible.
• Demand Model 2 (Quality seekers) is a variant of the first demand model but the
reserve price of a customer is proportional to
(
1− WTP−pi
WTP
)c
. This model captures
customers who use price as an indicator of quality. The parameter c has a similar
interpretation to b above.
• Demand Model 3 (Cheapest price subset) assumes that each customer sees a
different random subset of the available prices. Customers are assumed to select the
cheapest price that is visible to them. The subset is assumed to include a random
number of options uniformly distributed between d and e, which are parameters
that can be estimated from the demand data.
The fourth arm alone is used for the first 100 time periods with a relatively high ex-
ploration rate to provide sufficient data for estimating the parameters a, b, c, and d of
the three demand models by means of simulated annealing. After 100 time periods the
reward vectors are reset and the four-armed bandit assumes control of pricing. Similar to
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the previous two bandit algorithms, with probability ε an arm is selected randomly and
otherwise the most profitable arm is selected.
Optimal prices are chosen based on a forecast of the competitor price (duopoly) or
the profile of competitor prices (oligopoly), where we define the competitor price profile
to be an ordered list of competitors’ prices. For the oligopoly the competitor price profile
is forecast for the next time period using exponential smoothing with trend. In order to
estimate the optimal price to charge under each demand model, the algorithm generates a
set of potential prices and the projected revenue is evaluated at each price, for the forecast
competitor price profile. The price with the highest predicted revenue is assumed to be
the best price for this demand model. In an exploitation step, the algorithm selects the
arm with the highest predicted revenue and offers the best price for this arm.
6.1.6 Competitor ml
The approach of this competitor is to rely on machine learning techniques to predict de-
mand and optimize prices accordingly (ml is an acronym for machine learning). Much
emphasis is put on learning the demand characteristics, as the algorithm dynamically
switches back and forth from exploration to exploitation mode over time. In exploration
mode, during forty time periods, prices are set according to a cosine function around the
mean price level observed to test a variety of price levels and, possibly, confuse competi-
tors. After this learning cycle, demand is modeled using own prices and the competitor
prices as covariates by means of a variety of regression models (least-squares, ridge regres-
sion, Lasso regression, Bayesian ridge regression, stochastic gradient descent regression,
and random forest) and the best model, in terms of demand prediction, is selected through
cross-validation.
Subsequently, the model of choice is used during an exploitation cycle of variable
length: the length is sampled uniformly between 70 and 150, however, if the revenue
earned deteriorates too fast, then, immediately a new exploration cycle is initiated. The
price is optimized by discretizing the price space and computing the revenue for all prices.
When a new exploration cycle starts, so either when the exploitation cycle was finished
or because the revenue deteriorated significantly, all historical data is disregarded for the
benefit of capturing shifts and shocks in the market most adequately.
6.1.7 Competitor greedy
This competitor advocates a particularly simple strategy: set the price as the minimum
price observed in the previous time period. To avoid a “race to the bottom” with another
competitor, the following facility is implemented: if the minimum price observed in the
previous period is lower than the 10% percentile of all the prices observed in the last 30
time periods, then the price for the coming period is set as the maximum of this percentile
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and 5 (i.e., if this 10% percentile is smaller than 5, the price is set to 5).
6.1.8 Competitor wls
The characterizing feature of this competitor is that it aims to maximize own revenue
relative to its competitors. More precisely, it attempts to maximize own revenue minus
the revenue of the competitor that earns the most revenue. In doing so, it is assumed
that demand of competitor k equals d(pk, pk¯), where pk is the price of competitor k, pk¯ is
the (m− 1)-vector with the prices of the competitors of k, and where the notion of time
is suppressed. In addition, it is assumed that d(·, ·) is independent of permutations in its
second argument, i.e., in the vector pk¯. Thus, this algorithm aims to obtain the price that
maximizes own profit compared to the competitors, that is to solve in each time step,
max
p1
{p1d(p1, p1¯)−max{pkd(pk, pk¯) | k = 2, . . . ,m}}. (2)
where the competitors are indexed 1 to m and wls is indexed 1. Note that p1 ∈ pk¯ for
k ∈ {2, . . . ,m}.
The demand function is assumed to be of the form d(x, y) = a+bx+c
∑m−1
k=1 yk and the
parameters a, b, and c are estimated using weighted least squares (hence the name wls).
To capture different time-dependent aspects of demand, various schemes for the weighting
of observations are considered and evaluated based on the Median Absolute Error of their
historical demand predictions. The best weighting scheme is used in (2) to optimize the
price. For this purpose, the price for competitor k in the period to come is predicted
based on the median of the historical prices over some window, where the window length
is chosen to minimize the Median Absolute Error of historical price predictions.
Finally, for the purpose of exploration, during the first ten periods prices are random-
ized to guarantee sufficient variance in the observations to estimate the demand models.
In addition, when after these ten periods this competitor’s own price is constant for three
subsequent periods, the prices are randomized for the next period to induce exploration.
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